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THE NATION CHEATED OUT OF ITS FOOD.

(Reprinted from the *Free Press*.)

It is now one year since a Committee of Working Men of Newcastle, instituted a patient inquiry into the action of Diplomacy with reference to the Supply of Grain. They examined Mr. Urquhart, and Published his evidence. That evidence was at the time copied into the *Morning Advertiser* and *Morning Herald*. Extracts have appeared in our columns, and in those of other journals. At the time of its Publication, the matter was treated by the public with indifference. The case is now altered, and as the Pamphlet is out of Print, we have thought fit to Republish the whole of the Evidence.

ON THE LIMITATION OF THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN BY THE PAST ACTION OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY.

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE ASSOCIATION FOR WATCHING THE WAR.

Mr. Thomas Horn in the Chair.

Resolved,—That the Evidence given by Mr. Urquhart be reported at once to the Association, with a recommendation that it be immediately Published for the information of the People.
Newcastle-on Tyne, Nov. 21. 1854.

Mr. URQUHART examined.

The CHAIRMAN: You stated, at the public meeting on Wednesday, that the supply of grain had been cut off by the act of the English government. In what countries, and to what facts did you refer?

A.—I referred to Poland, to the communication through the Danube, and to the Ottoman empire.

Q.—In what position did the trade of Poland and England stand in 1830, and in what position afterwards?

A.—Before 1830 the Polish trade was free; that is to say, it was not subject to the Russian tariff. By the treaty of Vienna the free interchange of the different portions of Poland was established; and consequently the commerce of England with Poland was a commerce based on regulations independent of Russia; and the commerce of Poland was not subject to the restrictions of Russia, nor was the commerce of Poland part of the public wealth of the Russian empire. After the revolution, the reverse was the case. Our treaty rights in Poland were extinguished; the power of Poland to regulate itself was destroyed; and it became matter of option to the Russian government to restrict exportation or to suffer it; itself benefitting by the wealth acquired, and by the taxes imposed.

Q.—Do you believe that Poland could have maintained her independence if the English government had remained quiescent?

A.—I do. I do not know if the committee would wish me to illustrate the point.

Mr. RICHARDSON: If you please.

A.—At the period of the insurrection, and when the armies of Poland alone withstood the power of Russia, and maintained the contest for a considerable period balanced, the powers of Asia and of Europe, including all the neighbours of Russia, became sorely alarmed, and in course of time prepared for an unconcerted but simultaneous action in support of Poland. Austria, who had long been alarming to Russia by the dread that she—Austria—might seek to establish an independent Poland for her own defence, (evidence of which will be found in the secret document lately published by Prince Czartoryski, and of which I may afterwards read a passage or two), Austria, I say, herself, joined in the plan of seizing an opportunity to

restore Poland to a real independence. Negotiations were entered into between that state and France, and the plan was only frustrated by the interposition of the British government. The British government in like manner withheld Sweden and Turkey; and moreover withheld Persia, causing her armies, which had already marched, to return to their own territory under a threat of war from England. So that, that spontaneous confederacy of nations to support Poland, still erect, was broken upon its several points by a secret threat of war directed against them by an English minister: all of which facts are of public record, that respecting Austria and Russia having been published; the whole statement which I now make having been made in the House of Commons on the 23rd of February, 1848, and having been replied to most elaborately by Lord Palmerston, on the 1st of March in the same year,—in the course of which he does not deny one of these statements, but justifies them on this ground, that severally these states being weaker than Russia, by preventing them from attacking her, he had saved them from the consequences of their after partition. That debate, with Lord Palmerston's reply, I have had reprinted, and I have given several copies of it for the perusal of the members of this association.

Q.—Do you believe that the independence of Poland might have been saved without having recourse to war?

A.—Certainly. I may further add, that Russia could have designed nothing against Poland unless she was perfectly secure of the English government.

Q.—Supposing it was requisite, do you believe it to have been the duty of England to undertake a war for the maintenance of Poland?

A.—I do, Sir, but perhaps you would wish me, as in the last question, to go beyond a mere affirmative. It is upon the sacrifice of Poland that depends the power of Russia—not material power which she legitimately possesses, but that insidious power which she holds without any legitimate claim, and which resides in the prostration of law throughout Europe. It is by implicating partners in the guilt of the sacrifice of Poland that she has got possession of the cabinets of the continent, and independently of the corruption she has established

in their breasts, has laid prostrate all ideas of resistance to her from the dread of her power being associated with internal revolution. Poland is therefore a millstone around the neck of Europe, which, in course of time, and with proper management, must sink it. The danger was that Poland was too far gone for any resuscitating effort. But when the chance was afforded to governments that had not shared in its spoils, of an effort of the people itself to recover its life—and when those governments, or at least one of those governments who had shared in its spoils, came to offer a surrender of its share, and urge the reconstruction of the whole—the danger was over, and a facile triumph offered. The question of war was not therefore one that would have entailed any sacrifices; but I say, if there were any sacrifices that could have been entailed by a war to restore the rights of Poland, and England did not make these, then it was useless for her to have fleets and armies, and vain of her to speak of public law.

Q.—Do you believe that in submitting to this new system, introduced by Russia into Poland, the English government was guilty of a misdemeanour or a crime?

A.—I imagine that you refer, not to the political, but to the commercial part, a distinction most essential. The violation of the independence of Poland was a matter not connected with the treaty of Vienna, or any other treaty in the world; it touched our perfect rights, the surrender of which involved a great crime. But besides this, there was another unobserved crime. To suffer the Russian government to impose on its Polish provinces, even after conquering and incorporating them, its own tariff, was a violation of the laws of England—was a high crime and misdemeanour, and consequently ought to have been punished as such.

Q.—Is the public law of Europe applicable to such circumstances?

A.—The public law of Europe is virtually null, because we do not understand its application. I refer to that public law which gives to every state the power of resisting wrong. But there is another law, the written one—based upon treaties; and as at the treaty of Vienna all prior contracts were deliberately and of purpose *prepensé* set aside, the whole of that written law consists in these mere enactments. In the treaty of Vienna the most salient point, the constructive point on which the whole rested, was the establishment of the kingdom of Poland; this being swept away, you of course have no public law at all.

Q.—In what consists the interruption of the navigation of the Danube?

A.—The navigation of that river has been interrupted by three causes. The one is the interference of Russia with the internal regulations of the Turkish provinces of the Danube; another is the obstructions to the navigation of the river itself; and the third is the direct interference of the Russian government by enactments. The first is based upon rights supposed to be deduced from the treaty of Adrianople, a treaty created by a war in which England destroyed the naval forces of Turkey, and left her open to the attacks of her assailant; that assailant was bound by the most solemn of compacts with England and France not to seek, and not to acquire any privileges, possessions, and advantages of any kind. The second is connected with the same cause, for the Delta at the mouth of the Danube is held under the treaty of Adrianople. Having this position she has allowed the sand to accumulate. She has either allowed nature to do its work or she has assisted it, so as to obstruct the passage for vessels; being bound at the same time to England to observe the same conditions as were observed by the Turks in the possession of this territory before she occupied it. For, you must know that a territory passing from the possession of one government to another, carries with it any obligation with which it was charged. The third is the Ukase of February, 1836, commanding all vessels trading to the Danube to repair to the port of Odessa, 150 miles distant, and in Russian territory, there to perform quarantine. This manifest violation of the law of nations at the time roused general indignation throughout the country—more than any act which occurred before or since. Numerous petitions were presented to the House of Commons on the subject, and a motion was made by Patrick Stewart, equivalent to pledging the government to resist the aggression. The government obtained the withdrawal of this motion by declaring itself ready to do that which was required of them of their own impulse. Nothing was done, the excitement died away; it was forgotten. The Ukase remained in force; a charge was made by the Russian consulate upon vessels leaving Liverpool and London. For small vessels of 150 tons to be allowed to pass without undergoing the quarantine at Odessa as much as £30 was paid. The effect of these measures has been to impose a charge amounting to two dollars per ton upon vessels navigating that river—to diminish the size of the vessels that are able to enter, and to increase immensely the charges for in-

surance, not only because of the increased difficulty of the navigation, but from the prolongation of the period of service in so unhealthy a spot. The effects on the corn trade can only be approximately estimated; but they are dependent entirely on the submission of England to the illegal acts of Russia, directed not against Turkey, but against England herself. Let me add, that this case is detailed in one of the Blue Books published in the year 1853, entitled "Correspondence in reference to the navigation of the Danube," the perusal of which I would suggest, and the examination of which should be part of the business of the committee. They will there find that there was no attempt at resistance on the part of the English government to any of the measures of Russia; but on the contrary, that the English government takes its ground on every act of Russia to enforce submission on the part of Turkey, and of Austria. And it has gone to this extent. It effaced the vice-consulate at the mouths of the Danube as dependent on the Ottoman dominions, and positively made it dependent on the English Consul-General of Odessa, thereby transferring the jurisdiction, as far as it could, to the Russian government. But in this remarkable series of letters (they are not long), I could call attention to this—that all knowledge of the fact of the Ukase was suppressed, as also all the attempts of the nation to obtain redress, the submission of the case to the law officers of the crown, and their opinions upon it—in fact the whole question is suppressed in this correspondence; for this case took place in 1836,—the remainder are but the corollaries. The correspondence *opens with the year 1844*.

Q.—What was the amount of the trade so interrupted?

A.—I have anticipated this question to a certain degree. The trade so restricted has increased enormously, but it otherwise might have been doubled. It is this vast importation, amounting to 1,500,000 quarters, which has chiefly urged Russia on her present invasion.

Q.—You stated, at the public meeting, that the resources of Turkey are very great and undeveloped; that the Turkish government wish to open its ports, but, fearing Russia, applied to England for her coöperation; and that the English minister frustrated the objects of the Porte, and forced it to sign a treaty imposing prohibitory duties on its own exports. Have you any documents to substantiate these assertions? This being a very important question to the people of this country, of course it is natural that we should like to know on what basis these assertions rest.

A.—The documents connected with this transaction are public. They are contained in three blue books, under the title of "Correspondence relative to the Turkish Commercial Convention;" they are questions addressed by the English government, in various subsequent years after the conclusion of the treaty, to merchants and consuls, in order that they might get some understanding of their own treaty; and in the course of some of those questions and answers, some of which are from the ambassador, and some from the consul-general, consuls, and merchants—you gain a knowledge of all the facts. The treaty itself is published. The allegations which I made the other evening, were made in the House of Commons. There they stand, and beside them may be placed Lord Palmerston's replies, which were given on the same day, and in continuation on the 1st March 1843. So much for the transaction itself. These are the documents to which I refer, but I also detailed the circumstances connected with the history of this affair, which, of course, are not published;—they are, I may almost say, the principal materials which I had prepared for the impeachment of that minister, if the House of Commons had not escaped from the dilemma by dropping the matter. But there are many of the documents connected with this transaction in my possession, quite enough to substantiate in every point my statement. Some few have been published, but all those that are in my possession, have at various times been open to the study of individuals coming to me for information. They are open to any one whom the committee may appoint in London to examine, read, report, or even to make extracts from them; but as there have been one or two statements of these documents which have appeared at different times, I may refer you to the pamphlet which is on your table, ("Mystery of the Danube,") as containing an authentic statement in so far as it goes—not as merely flying words pronounced at the public meeting, but as deliberately set down and consigned to print. That statement is in the hands of the committee, and they can judge of its credibility from its contents: they can then interpret, according to their wisdom, the absence of a reply to these charges. And as in that pamphlet, there is Lord Palmerston's own reply, they have both sides of the question before them.

Q.—You have anticipated the question I was going to ask—whether any of these documents were available. Had you any part in these negotiations?

A.—Yes. The matter was one which originated with myself, and was adopted neither in the first instance by the Turkish government, nor in the second by the English except after a very great amount of labour had been expended, and after, of course, all the fallacies had been exposed, and all the objections removed, which have always to be met in urging measures great and new, and which, at the same time, directly strike at powerful interests no less than powerful prejudices. I state this, to show that it was not lightly undertaken, to be abandoned with equal facility, but a grave and serious decision.

Q.—In what capacity did you act, or in what position?

A.—When I first formed the plan, I was employed on a secret mission by the English government—a mission which gave me large roving power, so to say, and in accordance with it, I ought to have proceeded in my inquiries through Central Asia; but the interest that arose on that subject, and various others connected with our relations with Turkey, caused my delay, and finally postponed my journey eastward: so that the sanction of the English government was entirely given to the measures which I was urging on the Porte—though these measures were entirely my own—though adopted without the suggestion of the cabinet—I may say in opposition to all its opinions; but, for some reason or other, they found it necessary to support me, some by conviction, others by necessity. In that pamphlet there is a letter which will justify what I say, and as such I will read it. It is addressed by Lord Ponsouby, the English Ambassador in Turkey, to Dr. Milligan, physician to the seraglio, and who was at the time employed by the English government as intermediary. This letter is at page 60 in the pamphlet, it is as follows:—

MY DEAR SIR.—By Mr. Urquhart's desire, I forward you a letter for Moosher Ahmed Pacha, and also a copy of a memoir respecting the commercial system of this country, &c.

This memoir, I think, deserves to be minutely explained to the Pacha, and studied by him.

I am of opinion, that were it acted upon, in its main points, it would produce the most magnificent results to the Ottoman Empire. The latter part of the memoir states the mode of acting, to which I have always looked as the certain and effectual means whereby to defeat Russia—means most easy to be applied by us, and which, in the application, will produce great benefit to England: independent of their political action. Yours, very faithfully, PONSOUBY.

This was my position when the Turkish government decided to apply to England for her concurrence to a treaty of commerce, by which the trade of Turkey should be emancipated, and the export of raw materials permitted, the prohibition of which had been obtained by secret means by Russia. At the very moment this matter was brought to a head, I was removed from Constantinople, by a private order from Lord Palmerston, to the effect that I was disturbing the peace of Europe. I returned to this country, but I found, on my way, they had displaced Mr. Cartwright, a distinguished functionary, and appointed me to the consulate at Constantinople. That post was of course a most important one in commercial affairs, and it seemed a complete justification of my views with regard to trade. However, on my rejection of that office, I found myself completely destitute of any means of enforcing this matter, so long as the government of the Duke of Wellington remained in power. On the return of the other government to office, the Turkish ambassador having, in the meantime, come to England, and being directed to act as I should tell him—that being, in fact, his only instruction—after I had succeeded in getting the favourable disposition of a number of persons connected with the foreign department, and influential members of the government—the two under secretaries of state, the designated envoy in Persia, two of the principal persons in the Board of Trade; these, with the King himself and his private secretary, being all warmly and zealously engaged in the same matter, I thought the time was come to present the project to the government formally. The foreign minister being then Lord Palmerston, the answer which he gave to Nouri Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador, was, that this project was a Russian project. It was, of course, to be supposed that the ambassador would not communicate such a fact to me. But there was a person connected with the embassy who was so indignant, and so suspicious of the truth, that he came to me, and informed me of what had occurred. There has been brought out on another occasion, a letter of mine, written within a couple of days, and addressed to the private secretary of the King. If you please, I will read it.

(Extract.) To SIR HERBERT TAYLOR. Jan. 20th, 1835.

I have just been dismayed to learn that Nouri Effendi has written to Constantinople, expressing all the discouragement and despair, that Lord Palmerston had filled him with at their last interview, particularly his lordship's observation, that my proposal for the tariff, that has cost so much to bring to the pitch where it now is was a Russian proposal. This, indeed, is an act of suicide, and I am most anxious to know your opinion on the subject. Unless you have joined Lord Palmerston entirely—unless he understands the

fault he has committed, I do not see what chance there is of my being of any the slightest use, as serving the government, and, on the other hand, I am sacrificing myself and the question.

I have just learnt, also, that the mission of Ellis is in a state of abeyance, and that Mac Neill has come to the resolution of resigning his situation, unless the government adopts a more worthy policy.

The sovereign of England still possesses complete power over his servants, to the limit of his own knowledge.—This letter was nothing less than a charge of betrayal—there was no interval for the minister between averting the consequences of the discovery, or undergoing them. It so happened that this charge, that the treaty of commerce was a Russian proposal, led to my being appointed Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople. When I was appointed, I then urged its resumption on the part of England—or it might have been before—because the fact of my appointment was immaterial, considering the relations in which I stood with the government. I never executed any official duty, and therefore I may be mistaken in the order of precedence in the facts I am now referring to; but before or after this appointment, I was engaged in urging the adoption of this treaty of commerce as an English measure, and so proposing it to Turkey—that is, to make the English government adopt as its own, and propose to Turkey this very measure, which, when proposed by Turkey to England, it had rejected as a Russian proposal. After a time, and after this circumstance—and after a still graver one, the treaty was so adopted. To my surprise I was then told, that having been adopted by the Foreign-Office, I must fight now with the Board of Trade. I had, therefore, to commence the whole thing over again. I had to draw out tables and explanations—to stand and wait days and weeks, for a moment of interview with one and another, and use many other means requisite—I had to soften, to mollify and influence Mr. Poulett Thomson, and not with just success. However, after some two or three months, on forcing my way unwillingly into his presence, he said to me with great vehemence (striking his hand on a copy of the Portfolio, in which was an article of mine, on the facility of controlling Russia by means of her trade), “thank God for every hundred weight of tallow from Russia; every such hundred weight is an additional pledge of peace.” I have given enough to show the general nature of the conversation; and, on retiring, I went straight to the Foreign-Office, and detailed it to Mr. Backhouse. So strictly do I remember the circumstances, that I have the impression of his countenance now before me. He submitted what seemed a fit suggestion—that I should draw up a statement of the conversation, and of the facts, address it to Lord Palmerston to be put in circulation. The word “put in circulation” means a communication which passes from one cabinet minister to another. I consequently drew up upon the spot a letter—I am not sure whether it was to Mr. Backhouse or Lord Palmerston—I rather think it was to Mr. Backhouse himself. It is on record, and if you conduct this inquiry, so as to give it character and worth, you can have it. In that letter the charge is as fairly made as words can make it. It was put in circulation, and Mr. Poulett Thomson required my dismissal or threatened his own resignation. But the result of accusing Mr. Poulett Thomson of serving the Emperor of Russia was exactly the same as in the case of Lord Palmerston. In three days the Board of Trade accepts the treaty. Now, the treaty was to the effect, that the exports of Turkey should be subject to a duty to be regulated for each particular article by a commission of merchants, who should take as their rule the margin of difference of price between Turkey and Europe; so that the Turkish government might have the benefit of the export duty on articles which were peculiarly the produce of that country—exactly as England puts a heavy duty on cinnamon, in Ceylon, while, at the same time, it left entirely free those articles which competed with the trade of the rest of the world. This was the clause, by the insidious change of which, this treaty was altered to what you now see it, an alteration which only a Russian hand could have effected, because no other man understood it. That clause was altered to this—that in addition to three per cent. hitherto received, an additional rate of nine per cent. should be levied as compensation for monopolies and export duties abolished, a committee of merchants, appointed every five years, to establish the tariff according to this rate. In the course of the negotiation with Mr. Poulett Thomson, he had offered to abandon his hostility to the treaty, and so enable it to pass, if I would concur in imposing ten per cent. on Turkish produce. The treaty as it passed was with two per cent. more than the proposed duty of Mr. Poulett Thomson. But, then, in estimating the rate, the sum in money at twelve per cent., a novel process was tried. They took the prices at Constantinople, which are much higher than in the rest of the empire. They have no canals or railways there—communications are difficult, and transport is carried on at great expense. Besides, there are old charges as

in London, and there are peculiar forms, which are cumbersome, as well as expensive; and therefore provisions are very high in the capital—the common average price of grain is double that of the thrashing floors throughout the country. Now, the English government required that the scale should be adopted according to the prices of Constantinople. Thus, the duty upon grain, instead of being 12 per cent., became in reality 25 per cent. But I am answering a question in reference to the position I occupied. I see I have gone beyond it.

MR. WAKE: With regard to these merchants: Were they merchants in London—merchants of this country?

A.—British merchants of the country. I was saying that I was acting, in the second period, as Secretary of Embassy of the English government. I had thus not merely a connexion with the question as having originated it, but also an official connexion. I also had the fortune to enjoy the confidence of the monarchs of both countries. This gave me the means of knowing the secret action on both sides. I have now given the history of the transaction, as well as my own connexion with it, but I should leave it incomplete if I were not to add the reason why the Turkish government accepted this treaty, so contrary to the one I had proposed. I am able to give that reason from the mouth of the minister. On my last visit to Constantinople—on seeing the Grand Vizier—my first words were—“How was it possible for you to sign that treaty?” His reply was—“We did not know;” and then he added—“And what could we do?” I said—“Which was it—ignorance or bribery?” He answered with bitterness—“We were told that upon that condition alone we should be supported against Egypt.” With this I think I have completed the case.

MR. RICHARDSON: What would have been the effect upon the corn trade of the adoption of this treaty, as originally designed?

A.—The effect would have been to change the elements of that trade. The idea occurred to me first of the availability of Turkey, in the course of the year 1834. A famine having afflicted southern Russia, the neighbouring Turkish districts, which never before had exported any grain, sent in immense quantities to supply the necessities of Russia. On examining further into the matter, I saw that there was no restriction of that description which, in Europe, embarrasses agricultural enterprise, either in reference to fiscal system or tenure; the extent of arable land available was immense. I then came to inquire what cause had chained and concealed these resources, and found, at last, that their non-employment depended upon small and minute cobwebs, in the shape of regulations which had to be searched for with microscopic eyes. In the course of this inquiry I was put in possession, by the Turkish government, of all the communications which had passed since the year 1798, in matters of trade, with Austria, England, and Russia. Now, as the countries under the sway of the Sultan lie much nearer to the ports of Europe than Russia; as the rich countries of Russia lie further from the ports of Europe than the limits of her own territories; there is a difference of transport, both by sea and land, which would always give the preference, *ceteris paribus*, to Turkish produce. The Turkish system of taxes is more simple than the Russian, and the merchants' returns are effected without those obstructions by a high tariff which, interrupting the one trade, interferes with the other. If there be a cargo of grain in a Turkish port, and another in a Russian port, and the cargo in the Turkish port is 5 per cent. dearer than in the Russian port, and the distance and freight are equal, still this Turkish cargo is sold in preference to the Russian, because in the return value for the latter, more than the difference of 5 per cent. is lost by the English remitter. Russia does not take or purchase goods to an amount equivalent to what she sends, but only one fifth. She prohibits your goods, only seeking to sell the raw material. Turkey does the reverse; so that the amount of her imports is always the amount of her ability of purchase. If you put together cheapness, climate, distance, and facility of return, you will see that the cobweb obstructions being removed, and the removal, of course, could be effected by a word from England, the corn trade would have passed to Turkey—passed at one swoop. But all the other raw produce of Russia was equally furnishable by Turkey. It is a remarkable fact that the prohibitions in Turkey are solely on those articles which come in competition with Russia, leaving free all that does not. Your question refers to grain. I said the supply in Turkey was equal to any demand; take the year 1847, the scarcity in Europe was relieved solely by Turkey; that is, the amount supplied on that occasion, unexpectedly by Turkey, prevented famine from becoming perfectly frightful. The supply from Turkey amounted to as much, and one quarter more, than that of Russia from her southern ports. Turkey supplied all this corn because the increase of price was equal to the 25 per cent. tax. The increase of price in Europe, had just the effect of abrogating the Turkish duty for that year. Now, in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, you have seen that they have the

year before last, exported one and a half million quarters. Egypt exported to England alone 700,000 qrs.: the provinces south of the Danube exported in 1847, 2,000,000 qrs. We may thus estimate Turkey, independently of Asia Minor, or Syria, as able at present to furnish between 3 and 4,000,000 quarters. The productive power of Turkey, in consequence of the tariff, does not admit of exportation from a greater distance than fifty miles from the ports of shipment. In Wallachia and Moldavia, it does not range more than ten miles from the water communication with the Danube. By the calculations of Mr. Joanesco an increase of 10 per cent. in the price would suffice to double the amount of grain for exportation. In regard, therefore, to quantity, Turkey, under my treaty, would have been now supplying the whole of Europe. Now as to price; I have already referred to this point in one sense, namely, the lowness of price comparatively with Russia, as transferring the trade which Russia now enjoys to Turkey. But this supposes the maintenance of prices at their present level, or, at all events, the non-interference with ordinary rates by the relative supply of Russia and Turkey. But the amount which Turkey can supply, and the variety of fields from which it is derived, would make the competition no longer between Russia and Turkey, but between the different parts of Turkey itself. This opens a matter which casts into insignificance every question which has been discussed for the last twenty years. It was stated by me, at one of these recent public meetings, and I now restate it, that on Mr. Cobden's visit to Turkey, in 1840, these facts were placed within his knowledge: and I have the authority of Mr. Whittle, principal British merchant at Smyrna, for what I am about to state. He himself placed in his hands a statement of charges in case the trade had been free, by which it appeared that average wheat from Asia Minor could be landed at the port of Dublin at nineteen shillings and, I think, sixpence a quarter. With such a remunerating price, and the field so extensive, it is clear that the price of grain must have greatly fallen, and that fluctuations in England would henceforward have depended only on a failure of harvests in Turkey; you had had only not to frustrate insidiously what was already in your hand, to obtain a gigantic reservoir of corn. You might have had the grain of Europe permanently at—say 30 or 35 shillings a quarter. The effect of shutting out this trade might be supposed to be only leaving things as they were. But it was not so: the condition of Europe was undergoing a change since 1836. There is a demand—an enormous demand, which did not exist then—a demand for grain grown in lands foreign to the people who eat it. The facilities obtained by machinery do not equally extend to agriculture; consequently, we must have a constant over-reaching of our manufacturing population beyond our agricultural resources. I am not entering into the reasons for not having a supply of food within ourselves, I refer to no measure of policy, but to the absolute necessity of having the means of supplying the demand for food present and future, from other sources than Russia. By stopping the export of grain from Turkey, you are placing this country at the mercy of that power, which will have a monopoly of this commodity in proportion as you become more and more dependent on foreign supplies. Poland was the great supplying country of Europe; you have given Poland to Russia: next to that region come those, the outlet of which is by the Danube; you have allowed Russia to usurp the Danube. Now you have given Turkey also to her. The process employed on each field can only be rendered familiar by the analogy of forgery or assassination. However, there was a portion of Turkey that did export grain, because your minister could not reach it; that was Egypt. Mehemet Ali was a man among puppets, and could not be played with as the Sultan, or the Queen, or the people of England. He laughed your treaty to scorn. In Wallachia and Moldavia too, it was not accepted, because Austria would not admit of it. Austria is the only power that has ever resisted Russia. The control of Russia over the Lower Danube so disturbed her internal tranquillity that she could not endure it. Now Russia has purchased her off, on this very point. By that very act, which you imagine to be a proof of Austria's opposition to Russia, she receives the price of her fidelity to Russia. In 1834, when as yet not a cargo of grain had reached England from the Danube, I dared to say—give me Wallachia and Moldavia, and I will entinguish Russia. In the following year, the first vessel came—the year, fifteen—the year after that, thirty-seven. Preparations were made for the most unbounded shipments, when down came the Russian ukase of the 7th February. But after a pause, again exportation recommenced, and grain went pouring out until the beginning of last year, there was ready for shipment one million and a half of quarters. The Russian troops came in and ate it. The grain trade was ruined in those provinces, but it went to Odessa, the streets of which were deserted the day before. The

Russian trade had been swamped by the Wallachian trade—by the trade of those provinces now taken possession of by Austria. Every step is complete for the accomplishment of the work of Russia, whether in extinguishing the power of producing or in taking the produce as her own; depriving you of grain except through her sufferance, and making you pay for it the highest.

Q.—By the SECRETARY: You mean that the English minister effected an alteration of the law so inimical to the interests of England and Turkey, for the sole purpose of advancing the ends of Russia?

A.—For that sole purpose.

Q.—Is it your opinion that the export duties upon the produce of Turkey would materially diminish the demand and remuneration for labour in this country?

A.—Most certainly. It would diminish the demand for labour in as far as it diminished its remuneration, affecting the direct trade with Turkey, and the trade of England with other parts of the world. You will observe, that the export of our goods depends entirely on the rate at which we can sell them; and the rate at which we can sell them depends on many considerations; but one is, the price of food. The effect of rendering food very dear would be, to stop the exportation of manufactures altogether, and would force every country and every village to manufacture for itself. The increase of the price of grain by means of these duties, is one thing, but without ever being levied, they prevent the existence of a mass of grain on the fields of Turkey. They therefore prevent the introduction of that grain into England. They therefore prevent the exportation of the manufactures that would be called into existence to pay for this grain. These duties, in annihilating by anticipation this mass of grain, raise the price of all grain more or less—it may be as we see—to a very great degree. It has been calculated that last year £25,000,000 were sacrificed in England alone by the increase in the value of grain, created by the entrance of Russia into the Danubian provinces. Consequently, every working man throughout the land was made to pay to the Emperor of Russia, or by his act, £4. 10s. It is a curious fact that at the present moment, you have the direct export trade to the Levant not diminished, and the export trade to most other countries of the world, in the last few months diminished. At the present moment you are suffering in consequence of a restriction of orders, connected of course with the increase in the price of grain.

Q.—Would it not be the interest of the landowners of this country to impede the introduction of grain into the country?

A.—This is a very important question, but it is general. Make your question specific.

Mr. BAIN.—Has not our government, being composed of landed aristocracy, an object in conniving with Russia to prevent exports of grain from Turkey?

A.—You mean to say that the government acts for one class of the interests of British subjects.

Q.—Was the object of frustrating the Turkish treaty to serve the landed aristocracy by preventing grain from coming in cheap?

A.—No. The landed aristocracy had no more to say in the matter than the people or the crown, or the colleagues of the minister. There was in the matter but two purposes, and two persons—the one the connection, whatever it may be, of Lord Palmerston with Russia, and the other the connexion of Mr. Poulett Thomson with the Baltic trade. But I can give an answer conclusive in fact; at the time that this treaty was frustrated, and during the four years of anxious negotiation in the course of which this affair was managed, corn was not admitted free into England, nor did any man imagine at the time, the possibility of its being admitted free; for the aristocracy in this country was supposed to be a powerful body, and it was not its interest that corn should be admitted free.

Q.—By the SECRETARY.—Is the treaty in operation at the present time?

A.—Yes.

Mr. WAKE.—It extends to all countries, as well as England.

A.—The most remarkable part of a transaction is this. The treaty professes to be a concession made by England of a higher duty in consequence of the Porte abolishing its monopolies and internal duties. That is the pretence.

Q.—Is it made in that form, that it appears to be a Turkish project?

A.—It appears as though it were a demand made by England for the benefit of Turkish trade. As if she had said—here, I will make a concession of my rights. If you will give up internal duties, I will give up my rights, and pay a large sum. So soon as the Porte consented to this treaty, it gave up all monopolies for all nations as well as England. Therefore, there was no reason why any nation should go and impose on their own trade with Turkey a three-fold duty, when the equivalent was already granted. I do not mean to say

there was a *bona fide* negotiation, because it was the Turks who wanted to, and did abolish their monopolies before the treaty was executed. The terms of the treaty are false. You gave the additional nine and two per cent. for nothing at all, because Turkey had already abolished monopolies. But how comes it that France—Austria—all the powers of Europe rush in crying,—“We will join, too, pray do not leave us out.” No romance was ever penned or devised equal to this.

Q.—But had not the Turks themselves power not to levy his 12 per cent.?

A.—Allow me to go on with the story you have opened. Of course it was Russia's object to get the treaty generally accepted. She has agents in every cabinet. She manages everything throughout the world. It is difficult for you to understand this. But observe, here is a suicidal treaty, and every power joins it except Russia. You have the subjects of every other power going to Russian subjects and paying a per centage to allow their goods to pass in their names. The story of the adhesion of France is as follows:—The French merchants held a meeting and protested against the adoption of it by France; the Ambassador sent it home; he then received orders to sign a treaty similar to the English. He delayed doing so, and wrote again stating that the English treaty was very objectionable, and that much better terms could be obtained. He got a peremptory order in reply, to listen to no communications on the subject; that this was a matter settled, because it was a concession made to the friendship of England. It was not Russia that apparently acted; it was England—or rather the English minister. England and Russia were at that time on the most intimate terms; but England makes no endeavour with Russia for her to join. By standing out she made the world believe it was hostile to her. It was put forward in the Queen's speech as an unparalleled victory over Russia. It was paraded in all the journals of Europe as a most marvellous stroke of policy, and as the most fatal defeat to Russia that had ever occurred. This treaty, in which all Europe combines, has just this effect: it leaves Russia, who had not joined, free from every charge which it voluntarily imposes on the subjects of every other state. Those Blue Books to which I have referred consist of answers given by merchants and officials on the spot—answers given to the bewildered government which asks the meaning of its act. I will give one of the answers. Here is the testimony of Col. Rose. [Mr. Urquhart here read an extract.] Therefore the adoption of this treaty by the other powers is evidence that it was Russia's wish they should do so. Russia is not original; she does not design things. The new plan is only arisen. Had my measure been adopted, she would have been extinguished. She remained outside so long as that posture was requisite. Then she turns round without noise and tumult—signs a parallel treaty with Turkey, so that Europe should not feel the irritating effects of the privileges Russia enjoyed in consequence of its triumph over her. I cannot conclude the answer to such a question as this, without inviting you to consider the intellectual materials of which Europe is composed—of the texture of which you can judge by drawing the threads of a part.

Q.—Has not Turkey the power to destroy this treaty?

A.—Of course she has the power at any time to do so. The treaty does not impose on her the necessity of exacting this duty. But from the reply I have given you, you will see that there is Russia—the man; the rest—is a world of fools. The Turkish government was under the impression that it had to execute this treaty to the letter. These new imposts on trade are unlawful. The Turks have withdrawn from the farms which are so left in the hands of that miserable body of miscreants called Christians—Greeks and Armenians—to whom £500,000 yearly go under the treaty, and they know how to corrupt therewith the government. In May last, I received a communication from those who are striving against this evil at Constantinople, stating that they had great hopes of having this twelve per cent. abrogated. They have great terror for the English embassy. They have no fear of the Russian. Of course this was one of the reasons for Russia's crossing the Pruth.

Q.—Would it not be an object for this society to send an envoy to Turkey in the person of yourself, to suggest the abolition of this treaty?

A.—If I were to answer that question it would be travelling a little beyond the limits prescribed to inquiries of this kind; but, if you like, I will say what is suggested.

Q.—What plan would you suggest to rid Turkey of the duty on corn? Would it not be advisable to send an envoy to Turkey for that purpose, as soon as we are in a position to do so?

A.—I believe that there is nothing that is not in the power of this association. It depends entirely on the character and capacity of the men who form it. I believe that the case is so

grave, and the necessity so great; the means of influencing men's minds which it may become possessed of so varied and powerful—the facilities of action, when once it has formed for itself that purpose, so universal—that it may change, not merely the policy of the English government, but the character of the British nation. If you observe institutions which have power and value, you will never be able to trace their origin, because such institutions have arisen out of some necessity, have so come into being, and been consecrated by use. We are in a condition where our institutions, such as they are, are far beyond the reach of our repairing. We are in a case where danger is presented to us as a motive. It is a circumstance in which the nation may be re-made, if it finds men equal to the task. If you possess yourselves of the sources of that danger, you will find in that knowledge the means of counteracting it. The difficulty in this land—I know from experience—is to obtain adjudication—and no other. It has been well said by the first writer of our times, that “the first object of our institutions is to obtain adjudication in each case.” I have found—by the accident of knowing what is done in our times—that adjudication is not to be obtained, either in the institutions or dispositions of the people. Knowing of public crimes, I have gone to one man, and he would not heed it; and to another, and he could not act; one has not the power, and another has not the inclination; and so the case is always dropped for want of the means of adjudication. For the first time I am examined on these facts, and, therefore, I recognise the existence of a tribunal. You may consider this tribunal of no value, because it has no constituted authority. I reckon its value by that of the matters it undertakes to examine. No doubt a direct appeal to Turkey would be an easy means of attempting to abrogate a particular fact, but what is involved in the whole transaction is nothing less than the crime of treason, which the people of this country do not seem to understand. That meaning is what you understand of a house where there is poison in the kitchen—of a firm where there is a forger at the desk—of a fortress where a traitor watches on the tower, or guards the gate. This is the nature of the crime involved in the act here before you. Treason cannot exist in any state till its character is perverted. It is perverted by judicial blindness, it can be restored only by judicial sight. This investigation to-night is the first indication of a glimmer of light; and if you pursue it to the end it will be heard of hereafter: if not, it will pass away like so many other beginnings. I hope you may have emissaries to send to Constantinople and other places, and to do good at home as well as abroad.

Q.—Do I understand that the fact of sending an embassy to Constantinople, to advise the Porte to abolish the duty, would be looked at in this country in the light of treason?

A.—You mean to ask whether the government would consider it as a breach of the law? I should say—most decidedly not. Whoever has the knowledge of Lord Palmerston's guilt is gifted with impunity. There is no man who has charged him with guilt, who—choosing to accept it—has not received place and office. As to prosecution, I have tried every means to get it, but in vain! The Turkish Association formed in London took my letter to the Circassians and published it, appending to it the names of three of their own members, that they might bring into evidence the government's inability to prosecute where that prosecution would be putting themselves on trial for treason.

Q.—By the SECRETARY: You said, at one of the meetings last week, that England had no commercial knowledge. In what sense did you use the term?

A.—The merchants of this country may understand over-reaching one another in a matter of individual trade: but Russia understands over-reaching in a matter of general regulation.

Mr. WAKE: She carries the scheme a little higher?

A.—You have individual knowledge of business; but you have no comprehension either of commercial right or of commercial policy. Commerce is only one branch of many that constitutes the elements of diplomacy: therefore, commerce cannot be understood or practised by itself. For a nation to advance its ends by commercial means, that nation must be in possession of all talents and knowledge. Russia is in possession of that knowledge and those talents, and she uses them against you. You cannot have better evidence of this, than that this treaty was accepted with joy by the merchants of Constantinople; and in twelve months every man who put his name to the laudatory address has gone through the *Gazette*. For my part, I never saw an English merchant who knew anything of trade. When I began working in this matter, not one town possessed a single treaty of commerce. I would give one instance. At a dinner party in Glasgow, I spoke of the intense interest with which Russia regarded the troubles in Sicily. I was asked by one, what Russia could have to do with Naples? I said, if a politician asked me that

question I could understand it, but I could not understand a merchant asking it. He said, I don't know what a merchant has to do with Russia. I said, a merchant should know that the quarrel between England and Naples puts 1½ millions sterling into Russia's pocket every year; because the merchant, knowing whence oil and tallow come, knows that the restriction upon the oil tends to increase the price of, and demand for tallow. Russia, by commerce, will achieve her ends. She has already, without any commercial resources, made herself a commercial nation—because her trade is not the result of her natural resources, but of her capacity for management.

Mr. WAKE: I understand, the merchant only knows commerce by the process of profits that he individually gains—but that, to understand it in its broader sense, it should be taken as of what benefit to the country?

A.—In connection with the operation of tariffs.

Q.—Have these facts been communicated to the heads of the Anti-Corn Law League? Do they know that it was through England that the treaty of 12 per cent. was imposed on Turkey?

A.—I have laboured to the utmost of my ability to bring this subject before every one of these gentlemen. I told you what Mr. Cobden knew of the grain trade in Turkey.

The CHAIRMAN: Have you taken any steps to bring this matter before the other members of the government, or any other administration—or before Parliament, or the nation?

A.—I have brought it before other members of this government; I have had correspondence with the Board of Trade, especially when Mr. Gladstone was in office. I have with Lord Aberdeen, who rejected all information on the subject. I wrote to Sir Robert Peel, on his coming into office, in 1841, and begged him to send a person to me, for my door was open—that he might report whether there were grounds or not. This he specifically refused. I have applied for judgment before the Privy Council, as I have a right to do, as a servant of the Crown, making a charge against another servant. I then attempted Parliament; they would not come to a conclusion, but allowed the matter to drop. I have tried individually member by member. But there is not one man having courage to come forward and state what he knows. The question is one of crime; and there is not a man in England who will charge a crime. But I tell you as a fact, there is not a man of any station at all, or who considers himself to hold a station, who is not a coward!

Q.—Will you affirm these statements by oath before a magistrate?

A.—What I have detailed resolves itself into two branches; judgment of facts, and testimony to facts. With regard to the first, my judgment rests on reasons. In respect to the second, whatever I have stated of my own knowledge, I have stated it to you, as every word must be, on my honour, and I am also ready to confirm it with my oath.

By the SECRETARY: What is the general inference you draw from the facts detailed to-night?

A.—That this country is thoroughly rotten.

Mr. Urquhart's examination resumed.

By the CHAIRMAN: On reconsidering your evidence of last Friday, have you to add anything?

A.—Yes; on three points. The first is with reference to the question put to me as to the motive and purpose in preventing the free exportation of grain from Turkey. I have to add to what I then stated, that at the present moment, when the influence of England is supreme at Constantinople; when the political assistance given to Turkey is given upon conditions—namely, those of internal reforms, if it were the object of the English Government to have corn cheap, it would require from the Turkish government the abrogation of the 12 or 25 per cent. duty, which, I before stated, is in direct contradiction to the religious laws and political constitution of the Turkish empire. It has been often already remarked, that that high duty was not protected or acted against by England when England was known to be supreme in the councils of Turkey. But the value of that abstinence appears to be manifoldly increased, when we are suffering from famine.

Mr. CRAWSHAY:—Does the export duty apply to Egypt?

A.—That question was answered in detail at your last sitting. It was made to apply to Egypt by the framers of the treaty, but the Pacha would not submit to it, and that point comes singularly to illustrate what I have now said, showing that the Pacha of Egypt was able to resist its imposition. It was very easy for England to cause it to be removed, supposing she had no hand in urging its imposition.

The second point I wished to mention has reference to the Danube. In addition to the obstructions placed by the interference of Russia, submitted to, confirmed, and enforced by England, there is a totally distinct series of facts in the treaty negotiated with Austria, about the same time as that negoti-

ated with Turkey. That treaty is of as great importance to the understanding of the subject as the Turkish treaty itself. If, therefore, it be the pleasure of the sub-committee, I will endeavour to condense that case. The Austrian treaty was a plan of the Austrian government, just as the Turkish treaty was a plan of the Turkish government—that is, it was suggested by an Englishman at Vienna. Sir Frederick Lamb (Lord Beauvale, brother to Lord Melbourne) adopted it; and through Lord Melbourne it was pressed on Lord Palmerston, just as the treaty of commerce was by the late king. The object of that treaty was to combine England, Austria, and Turkey in a common act to insure the navigation of the Danube. It was the forging of a common shield, and placing it against the interference of Russia—converting from that hour every local aggression into a flagrant political offence. It was laboriously thrust upon the attention of the Foreign Office just as the Turkish was, it was accepted, and then it was betrayed in exactly the same fashion. The practical object of the treaty was this—that there should be a relaxation of the navigation laws in England, so as to admit reciprocally the vessels of Austria and Turkey with Turkish or Austrian produce into British harbours, as if with cargoes of their respective countries; that is to say,—that a Turkish vessel could bring Austrian goods into England as if she was an Austrian vessel; and that an Austrian vessel should bring Turkish goods into England as if she was a Turkish vessel. It was altogether a novel and ingenious device, and, as is evident, it was happily calculated to hit one point—the freeing of the navigation of the Danube, giving common rights to those three powers. The treaty was not confided to the hands of the gentleman who was to carry it to Milan, where the Emperor then was, but sent afterwards, in a week's time, and when it arrived it was altered. It was altered by the exclusion of Turkey, and by dropping the negotiation with Turkey, which was to be part of the negotiation with Austria; and the pretence for dropping the negotiation with Turkey was, that a direct treaty with Turkey had been signed. I may further mention that the Austrian government offered to place the negotiation of the treaty on its part in the hands of the British commissioner, or agent; so that England would have stood at Constantinople as having to negotiate for Austria. When the treaty arrived in this fashion at Milan, in June—I think—of 1833, or it might be later, Prince Metternich expressed himself with the extremest bitterness and sarcasm, and said something to the effect that he supposed the English minister was anxious that Austria should treat with Russia. The consequence was, that Austria did treat with Russia for the navigation of the Danube, by which Austria admits only such merchandise as Russia permits to enter the Black Sea! This fact, or series of facts, you will see, has an essential connexion with those stated the other evening, as showing the purpose of the English government throughout, and at every step, to sacrifice the Danube—to withdraw it from Turkey, and to withdraw it from Austria, and place it in the hands of Russia. I should leave the matter incomplete if I did not tell you the results of this treaty. So soon as it was signed, the merchants in the Danube shipped cargoes of grain. When they arrived, they were immediately seized and confiscated. The first case was that of the *Vallaco*, which was seized at Gloucester, for contravention of the navigation laws. Neither by order in council, nor by a measure in the house, did the government proceed to enable their treaty to take effect. The vessel was released under a small fine, and no more shipments took place. Ten months afterwards, Mr. Herries, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, brings the subject before the house in the form of a vote of censure on the government, and it is only in the face of that vote of censure that the government move. A bill is passed by the opposition to legalise the treaty. The questions put in the House between the signing of the treaty and the seizing of the *Vallaco*, present, perhaps, as wonderful an exhibition of human imbecility as this world—old and dotard as it is—has ever seen. The questioners were—Lord Aberdeen and Sir Robert Peel. It cannot be talked of in the ordinary terms of courtesy and civility.

The third point I wish to add, and the last, is this—I was asked whether the secret of the frustration of the treaty with Turkey was not the aristocratic interest in opposition to the low price of corn. I answered first, that I knew it had no connection with that motion; and that I knew what the object was—a Russian object. Secondly, that the aristocratic power had no existence in this country. I illustrated this by facts. Thirdly, that at the time this transaction took place, grain could not be imported free into England. I would now confirm these statements by two facts: the one, that it was the aristocratic and landed interests that forced the government into the relaxation of the navigation laws in reference to the Danube; the second, the treaty with France. I am

the more pleased to refer to this matter in the presence of Mr. Attwood, who knows something personally about it. The treaty with France would have largely benefitted the landed aristocracy of this country, both by an increase of the prospective value given to their property, and by a decrease of the charges on those articles which they chiefly consume. It was frustrated by the act of the same minister. As the treaty with France is most important in this inquiry, if it be agreeable to the committee, I will give a succinct statement of that which occurred. That treaty was forced upon the Foreign Office like the others. It was forced upon the government and frustrated in secret. It was undertaken to remove restrictions which pressed, on the one side, on the raw material and the produce of France, particularly its wines; and, on the other, hampered the trade of manufactured articles from England. The matter was taken up with zeal by Mr. Labouchere, who was at the time President of the Board of Trade. He cast his eye on a chief officer of the Board of Trade for its negotiation—Mr. Porter, had been intimately acquainted with the whole of these matters with regard to Austria, Turkey, and others which I have not detailed to you. When Mr. Labouchere offered him the appointment, he said there was only one condition on which he would accept it, and that was, that it was not to be considered in any way connected with the Foreign Office, and that he should not be under the necessity of speaking to, seeing, or having written communications with Lord Palmerston. When Mr. Labouchere expressed some surprise at the extravagant nature of the proposal, he replied that he had his reasons for it; and Mr. Labouchere refrained from inquiring what they were. Mr. Porter went further. He recorded this opinion in the office, and left it there—to the effect that he did so from motives of precaution, because he felt certain, if Lord Palmerston had any hand in the matter, he would cause it to fail. Mr. Porter went to Paris. The objections on both sides were removed, and arrangements according to the original stipulations were in fact completed. The pen, so to say, was dipped in ink to sign the treaty, when a note from Lord Palmerston reached the hands of M. Thiers. This statement, as nearly all those I have made, has been made in the House of Commons. I will read the statements which Mr. Anstey made, Mr. Porter being then alive. [Mr. Urquhart then read an extract.] You will be anxious to hear Lord Palmerston's answer. Not a single syllable. It was calculated that the effect of that treaty, had it not been frustrated, would have been to have increased the exports of England by ten millions sterling a year.

Newcastle-on-Tyne, March 22, 1855.

To the Honourable the Commons in Parliament assembled. The Petition of the undersigned, the Chairman and Members of the Newcastle-on-Tyne Committee for Watching the War. Humbly sheweth—That the accompanying publication, being a report of evidence given before them by D. Urquhart, Esq., on the Limitation of the Supply of Grain to this country, by the past action of British Diplomacy, doth appear to them to contain charges of the utmost gravity against the honour of the principal Minister of England.

That these charges are as follows:—That the supply of grain to this country has been cut off by the act of that Minister and of his colleagues for the time being, by conniving at the destruction by Russia of those commercial rights of Poland which were established by the Treaty of Vienna; by conniving at the acquisition of the mouths of the Danube by Russia; and at her obstruction of the navigation of the Danube in violation of the Treaties of Vienna and Adrianople; and by inducing the Ottoman Government to impose a heavy duty upon its own exports, to the manifest injury of Turkey and England, and to the equally manifest advantage of Russia.

That the series of acts by which the supply of the people's food has been restricted, have not only served the interests of Russia and of Russia only, but have been committed with that object, and thus involve a criminal connection between the Minister of England and that foreign cabinet with which we are at war.

That for these reasons a judicial investigation into these charges is absolutely necessary, and that in its due prosecution the very existence of the empire may be involved.

Your petitioners therefore pray that without loss of time your honourable house may appoint a committee for the investigation of these charges, and further take immediate steps for restoring British commerce to its ancient rights in Poland, for opening the navigation of the Danube, and for relieving the Turkish Empire from the commercial restrictions imposed upon it.

And your Petitioners will ever pray.
 CHARLES ATTWOOD. Rt. GEO. GAMMAGE.
 GEORGE CRAWSHAY. GEORGE STOBART.
 THOMAS HORN. THOMAS JOHNSON.

&c., &c., &c.